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ASBESTOS MANUFACTURERS: THE PATHWAY
TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES
This is as strange a maze as e'er men trod;
And there is in this business more than nature
Was ever conduct of. Some oracle
Must rectify our knowledge.
SHAKESPEARE, The Tempest, Act V, Scene 1, Alfonso speaking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thousands of claims against asbestos manufacturers, most by insulation
workers, have been filed in state and federal courts across the United States
and this figure is expected to increase by several hundred new claims each
month.' It is estimated that twenty-one million living Americans have been
occupationally exposed to asbestos through 1980,2 and additional millions
have been or are being exposed to the deadly mineral in schools nationwide.3
Medical science presently offers no cure for the damage incurred by asbes-
tos-related diseases.4 Thus, "the injured party's only remedy is judicial
relief."5
1. "To date, more than 30,000 personal injury claims have been filed against asbestos
manufacturers and producers. An estimated 180,000 additional claims of this type will be on
court dockets by the year 2010." In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir.
1986). This Note focuses on the state of Delaware, where the court stated that over 100 law-
suits based on participation in an industry-wide conspiracy to conceal and suppress informa-
tion on the health hazards of asbestos were pending. Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 147
n.2 (Del. 1987).
2. Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, who is widely acknowledged as the world's leading authority on
asbestos disease "estimated that among the twenty-one million living American men and wo-
men who had been occupationally exposed to asbestos between 1940 and 1980 there would be
between eight and ten thousand deaths from asbestos-related cancer each year for the next
twenty years." P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON
TRIAL 6 (1985) [hereinafter OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT].
3. "[T]he Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that as many as 15 million
students may be attending schools with asbestos-containing ceiling panels and other exposed
asbestos surfaces, and that 1.2 million teachers and other school employees may also be under-
going daily exposure to the mineral." Id. at 123.
4. See Comment, Asbestosis: Who Will Pay the Plaintiff?, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1491 (1983).
Injuries from exposure to asbestos fibers range from fatal cancer to mild impairments of lung
capacity. However, three distinct diseases associated with asbestos exposure include: asbesto-
sis, mesothelioma, and cancers (including lung, gastrointestinal and pulmonary cancer). See
Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litiga-
tion, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 579 nn.10-12 (1983) [hereinafter Special Project].
5. Comment, supra note 4, at 1491-92 (footnote omitted).
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The main thrust of asbestos suits today is that asbestos manufacturers are
guilty of the tort of conspiracy: the intentional misrepresentation and active
concealment of the potential health hazards from exposure to asbestos or the
failure to warn of the health risks involved.6 In Delaware, conspiracy claims
6. See Temple v. Raymark Indus. Inc., No. 82C-JL-80, slip op. at 28 (Del. Super. Ct.
Aug. 31, 1988) (1988 Del. Super. LEXIS 339) (plaintiffs can recover for conspiracy by either
proving failure to warn or by proving intentional concealment, and they need only prove one
by a preponderance of the evidence to recover damages). The court stated further:
In order to establish a claim for conspiracy [in Delaware] based on intentional con-
cealment, plaintiffs must prove the following elements by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(1) that [the defendant] and one or more other manufacturers of asbestos-contain-
ing products conspired to intentionally conceal or misrepresent the health hazards of
asbestos;
(2) that one of the members of the conspiracy sold an asbestos-containing product
which was eventually used in plaintiff's place of work;
(3) that at the time that product was sold by that member of the conspiracy, the
member knew that asbestos containing products were dangerous to health;
(4) that one of the members of the conspiracy concealed, the hazards of asbestos-
16ontaining products from publications, including medical articles, trade magazines,
promotional brochures or newspaper articles;
(5) that the plaintiffs did, in fact, remain ignorant of the dnagers [sic] of asbestos-
containing products and as such were exposed to asbestos-containing products manu-
factured by at least one of the conspirators and were injured;
(6) that the member of the conspiracy who engaged in the concealment referred to
above intended that plaintiffs rely on the absence of information in any of such
publications;
(7) that the member's conduct enumerated above was intended to be in furtherance
of the objectives of the conspiracy;
(8) that plaintiffs justifiably relied on the absence of or inadequacy of warning of the
dangers to health.
Id. at 28-30.
In order to establish a claim for conspiracy based upon intentional failure to ade-
quately warn, plaintiff must prove the following elements by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(1) that [the defendant] and one or more other manufacturers of asbestos-contain-
ing products conspired to intentionally conceal or misrepresent the health hazards of
asbestos;
(2) that one of the members of the conspiracy sold an asbestos-containing product
which was subsequently used in plaintiff's place of work;
(3) that at the time that product was sold by that member of the conspiracy, that
member knew that asbestos-containing products were dangerous to health;
(4) that a manufacturer of asbestos-containing _products at the time of this sale of
asbestos-containing product had a duty to inform the buyer and the users of that
product of the danger of such product to health, which danger was known to that
manufacturer;
(5) that in connection with that sale, that member of the conspiracy did not give an
adequate warning that asbestos-containing products were dangerous to health;
(6) that at the time that the member of the conspiracy sold that product, that mem-
ber intended not to give a warning or an adequate warning that asbestos-containing
products were dangerous to health;
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against former employers are barred by the workmen's compensation exclu-
sivity provision." This provision expresses the legislature's intent that all
employee actions against employers for work-related injuries, including oc-
cupational diseases, are within the exclusive coverage of the workmen's com-
pensation law and may not be maintained under the common law.' Seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for their occupational injuries, plaintiffs
have turned their attention to the manufacturers of asbestos because such
actions are not barred by Delaware's workmen's compensation laws. Em-
ployees have thus used a shotgun approach in drafting their complaints,
naming most national manufacturers of asbestos-containing products as de-
fendants, and adding local suppliers and retailers of such products as long as
some relationship to plaintiffs' asbestos exposure exists.9
This Note begins with an examination of the legislative history behind
Delaware's workmen's compensation laws in barring conspiracy suits
against employers. It then analyzes the recent development in Delaware
(7) that the member of the conspiracy who engaged in the conduct enumerated
above intended that plaintiffs rely on the absence or inadequacy of warning of the
danger to health;
(8) that the member's conduct enumerated above was intended to be in furtherance
of the objectives of the conspiracy;
(9) that plaintiffs justifiably relied on the absence of or inadequacy of warning of the
dangers to health;
(10) that plaintiff was exposed to an asbestos-containing product.
Id. at 30-31.
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1974). Section 2304 provides:
Every employer and employee, adult and minor, except as expressly excluded in this
chapter, shall be bound by this chapter respectively to pay and to accept compensa-
tion for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment, regardless of the question of negligence and to the exclusion of all other
rights and remedies.
8. See Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226 (Del. 1982) (actions under work-
ers' compensation statute held exclusive remedy and precluded intentional tort actions by as-
bestos workers against employers alleging fraudulent concealment of known asbestos-related
dangers); Nutt v. A. C. & S., Inc., 466 A.2d 18 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983), aff'd sub nom., Mergen-
thaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984) (deceit that precedes and helps
produce an injury was barred by exclusive remedy provisions because it merges into the injury
for which a compensation remedy is provided); Farrall v. Armstrong Cork Co., 457 A.2d 763
(Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (A conspiracy claim against former employer was barred by workmen's
compensation exclusivity principle). The Farrall court held that an employer, who is also a
supplier of products used by employees, functioning in a dual capacity, still enjoys immunity
from common law liability under the exclusivity principle and is equally immune from an
attempt by a third party to require contribution by the employer. Id.
9. Bell v. Celotex Corp., Nos. 85C-FE-25, 85C-AP-60, slip op. at 3 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan.
19, 1988) (1988 Del. Super. LEXIS 13) ("This format has been utilized in the various cases
which have generated the principles of law which are generally applied to the Delaware asbes-
tos cases.").
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law, specifically the facts and issues in Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt.'o In Nicolet, the
court held that an asbestos manufacturer whose products did not cause the
purported injury, but who allegedly conspired with other manufacturers to
suppress medical evidence warning of the health dangers of asbestos inhala-
tion, was liable for conspiracy and fraudulent concealment." The Note then
discusses the potential effects the ruling may have on both asbestos manufac-
turers and employers.
This Note also outlines a manufacturer's defense which was recently rec-
ognized by the State of Delaware, namely the "sophisticated purchaser" de-
fense.12 The basic thrust of the defense is that if a manufacturer, distributor,
seller, or supplier provides a product to a purchaser/employer knowledgea-
ble of the dangers therein, then there is no duty to warn either the purchaser
or the purchaser's employees of that danger. The supplier thus relies on the
"sophisticated purchaser" to warn and protect its own employees.' 3 Where
the defense is successful, the manufacturer is relieved of liability, and the
employer is protected from suit by the workmen's compensation laws.
Amending Delaware's workmen's compensation law to allow the plaintiff
the right to elect his remedy, i.e., to forego compensation to which he is
otherwise entitled under the statute in favor of suing the employer at law for
damages, can result in a more equitable and reasonable approach to ensuring
that those responsible for work-related injuries share the expense
proportionately.
Ii. DELAWARE'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
The philosophy of Delaware's workmen's compensation laws14 is to give
an injured employee, irrespective of the merits of his cause of action, a
prompt and guaranteed means of receiving compensation and medical care
without subjecting him to the hazards and delays of a law suit. 5 While the
10. 525 A.2d 146 (Del. 1987).
11. Id. at 147.
12. See In re Asbestos Litig. (Merganthaler), 542 A.2d 1205, 1212 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
The Court held that:
[W]hen a supplier provides a product it knows to be dangerous to a purchaser/
employer whom the supplier knows or reasonably believes is aware of that danger,
there is no duty on the part of the supplier to warn the employees of that purchaser
unless the supplier knows or has reason to suspect that the requisite warning will fail
to reach the employees, the users of the product.
13. See Temple v. Raymark Indus. Inc., No. 82C-JL-80, slip op. at 5 (Del. Super. Ct.
Aug. 31, 1988) (1988 Del. Super. LEXIS 339).
14. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301 (1974).
15. See Hill v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 53 Del. 117, 124, 165 A.2d 447, 449-50 (Del. 1960)
(The Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act is a compulsory Act and such Acts were passed
for the benefit of employees to relieve them from the expense and hazard of lawsuits).
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purposes of the workmen's compensation laws are numerous, two recurring
themes emerge: workmen's compensation provides a scheme for assured
compensation for work-related injuries without regard to fault and the laws
relieve employers and employees of the expense and uncertainty of civil
litigation. 6
The question of whether complaints in cases involving fraud, deceit, and
conspiracy by employers state viable causes of action upon which relief can
be granted is one of legislative intent and turns on the construction given to
the exclusivity principle and its legislative history. The exclusivity principle
found in Delaware's Workmen's Compensation statute17 refers specifically
to "personal injuries" caused by accidents. Review of the legislative history
of the Delaware workmen's compensation laws, however, reveals that the
exclusivity principle encompasses not only injuries caused by accident, but
also all compensable occupational diseases, such as asbestosis. 8
Prior to 1937, only those injuries which resulted from accidental physical
violence to the bodily structure were covered by the statute. 9 In 1937, the
legislature amended the statute to include coverage for specifically listed
"compensable occupational diseases ... arising out of and in the course of
the employment."20 Asbestosis was not compensable under this statute,
however, a 1949 amendment eliminated the list of compensable occupational
diseases and extended coverage to "all occupational diseases arising out of
16. See Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del. 1982).
17. See supra note 7.
18. See infra notes 20 & 21.
19. See 29 Del. Laws, ch. 233 (1917):
Every employer and employee shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to be
bound by the compensatory provisions of this Article and to have accepted the provi-
sions of this Article, respectively, to pay and to accept compensation for personal
injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, re-
gardless of the question of negligence, and to the exclusion of all other rights and
remedies.
20. See 41 Del. Laws, ch. 241 (1937):
[T]erms Construed: The term "injury" and "personal injury" as used in this Chapter
shall be construed to mean violence to the physical structure of the body, such dis-
ease or infection as naturally results directly therefrom when reasonably treated and
compensable occupational diseases, as are hereinafter defined, arising out of and in
the course of the employment .... Compensable occupational diseases shall not in-
clude any other than those scheduled below and shall include those so scheduled only
when the exposure stated in connection therewith has occurred during the employ-
ment, and the disability has commenced within five months after the termination of
such exposure: Occupational Diseases include: Anthrax; Lead Poisoning; Mercury
Poisoning; Arsenic Poisoning; Phosphorous Poisoning; Benzene, and its homologues,
aid all derivatives thereof; Wood Alcohol Poisoning; Chrome Poisoning; Caisson
Disease; Mesothorium or radium poisoning; Carbon Disulphide; and Hydrogen
Sulphide.
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and in the course of employment.. ." The exclusivity provision did not
distinguish between accidental work-related injuries and occupational dis-
eases in awarding benefits under the statute. Therefore, the exclusivity pro-
vision was rephrased by the Supreme Court of Delaware to read: "[e]very
employer and employee ... shall be bound.., to pay and to accept compen-
sation for all occupational disease.., only when the exposure.., has oc-
curred during the employment .... "2 2 Further, the term "personal injury"
as used in the exclusivity provision expressly includes "compensable occupa-
tional diseases.",
23
As noted previously, the Delaware workmen's compensation laws assure
compensation for work-related injuries and relieve the parties from the ex-
pense of litigation.24 In effect, the cost of industrial injuries is placed on the
customers who enjoy the benefits of the industry25 and the cost of employ-
21. 47 Del. Laws, ch. 270 (1949):
[C]ompensable occupational diseases shall include all occupational diseases arising
out of and in the course of employment only when the exposure stated in connection
therewith has occurred during the employment and the disability has commenced
within five months after the termination of such exposure.
22. See Alloy Surfaces Co. v. Cicamore, 221 A.2d 480, 486 (Del. Super. Ct. 1966) (on the
strength of the statutory history of the compensation laws, the court has not previously distin-
guished between accidental work-related injuries and occupational diseases in awarding bene-
fits under the statute).
23. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(12) (1974) (" 'injury' and 'personal injury' mean
violence to the physical structure of the body, such disease or infection as naturally results
directly therefrom when reasonably treated and compensable occupational diseases and com-
pensable ionizing radiation injuries arising out of and in the course of employment"); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301(4) (1974) (compensable occupational diseases are defined as "all
occupational diseases arising out of and in the course of employment only when the exposure
stated in connection therewith has occurred during employment"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 2328 (1974):
([t]he compensation payable for death or disability total in character and permanent
in quality resulting from an occupational disease shall be the same in amount and
duration and shall be payable in the same manner and to the same persons as would
have been entitled thereto had the death or disability been caused by an accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment.).
24. See Hill v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 53 Del. 117, 124, 165 A.2d 447, 451 (Del. 1960) (the
philosophy of the workmen's compensation law is to give an injured employee, irrespective of
the merits of his cause of action, a prompt and sure means of receiving compensation and
medical care without subjecting himself to the hazards and delay of a lawsuit). See also New
Castle County v. Goodman, 461 A.2d 1012, 1014 (Del. 1983) (the Delaware Workmen's Com-
pensation Act is construed in order "to fulfill its twin purposes of providing a scheme for
assured compensation for work-related injuries without regard to fault and to relieve employ-
ers and employees of the expenses and uncertainties of civil litigation").
25. See generally Ianire v. Univ. of Del., 255 A.2d 687 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969), aff'd sub
nom. Diamond State Tel. Co. v. Univ. of Del., 269 A.2d 52 (Del. 1970) (by providing for an
automatic limited recovery under workmen's compensation, employers are guaranteed a cer-
tain and predictable liability for insurance purposes and employees are guaranteed a certain
amount of immediate compensation).
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ment injuries are shifted to the consumer as part of the cost of production. 26
These objectives have been embodied in the amendments to the Delaware
workmen's compensation laws. For this reason, the legislative history of the
law evinces an intent to make workmen's compensation an exclusive remedy
in occupational disease cases, thereby barring common law claims against an
employer.
In sum, claims by workers exposed to asbestos alleging gross negligence
and intentional tort for falsely deceiving the workers as to the true facts
concerning the dangers of asbestos are encompassed within the workmen's
compensation laws and cannot be maintained under the common law against
the employer. Consequently, employees are not suing their employers.
They are instead suing the manufacturers of asbestos for compensatory and
punitive damages relying on fraudulent concealment and conspiracy
theories.
III. THE DECISION IN Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt
A. Factual Background
The case of Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt 27 arose when the Superior Court, New
Castle County, denied Nicolet's motion for summary judgment on a com-
plaint alleging that Nicolet conspired with other members of a trade associa-
tion to conceal information on asbestos hazards.28 The superior court
concluded that Nicolet would be liable to plaintiffs for injuries caused by
exposure to another party's asbestos if plaintiffs could show that defendants
conspired to suppress information about the health hazards of asbestos.29
Nicolet did not dispute the fact that the plaintiffs were exposed to the
asbestos of other companies who were members of the Quebec Asbestos
Mining Association (QAMA) and the Asbestos Textile Institute (ATI). °
26. See generally Price v. All Am. Eng'r Co., 320 A.2d 336 (Del. 1974) (the fundamental
purpose of workmen's compensation is to shift the cost of employment injuries to the con-
sumer as part of the cost of production).
27. 525 A.2d 146 (Del. 1987).
28. In re Asbestos Litig., 509 A.2d 1116 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 525 A.2d 146 (Del.
1987). The superior court denied Nicolet's motion for summary judgment on the conspiracy
issue and held that material facts existed as to whether Nicolet and members of the trade
association had conspired to conceal public disclosure of asbestos hazards. 509 A.2d at 1122.
29. Id. at 1120.
30. Nicolet, 525 A.2d at 148. Plaintiffs' allegations against the defendant, Nicolet Inc., are
summarized as follows: "Nicolet or its wholly owned Canadian subsidiary, Nicolet Mines,
Ltd., was a member of the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association ("QAMA") from 1948 until
1968 and members of the Asbestos Textile Institute ("ATI") in 1969, 1971 and 1972" and
further, "[m]embers of the referenced trade associations suppressed publication as well as gen-
eral dissemination of medical and scientific data concerning the health hazards associated with
inhalation of asbestos fibers." Id.
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Nicolet did, however, deny that it was a member of the QAMA and that it
knowingly took part in this conspiracy. 31 The court noted that knowing
participation in a conspiracy need not be by express agreement; tacit ratifica-
tion is sufficient. 32 The court stated, "[l]ikewise, consciously parallel action
is not sufficient to show conspiracy, but it is enough that knowing concerted
action was contemplated or invited, the defendant adhered to the scheme
and participated in it .... Further, there was some evidence that Nicolet
had direct contact with members of QAMA, whose members publicly mini-
mized the dangers of asbestos after 1968.34 In denying summary judgment,
the court held there was some evidence from which a jury could reasonably
conclude the existence of the alleged conspiracy by Nicolet to suppress infor-
mation regarding asbestos and its harmful effects. 3
B. The Supreme Court of Delaware's Decision
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that a
cause of action existed against Nicolet, Inc.: "if competent medical evidence
as to the dangers of asbestos was intentionally misrepresented and sup-
pressed [by Nicolet] in order to cause plaintiffs to remain ignorant thereof,
coupled with proof that such suppression caused injury to the plaintiff, the
alleged tort is established.",3 6 The court also concluded "that under the well-
settled law of civil conspiracy, Nicolet may be jointly and severally liable for
damages caused by the acts of co-conspirators if such acts were committed
31. Id.
32. Id. See also In re Asbestos Litig., 509 A.2d at 1121 (citing De Jong Packing Co. v.
United States Dep't of Agric., 618 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061
(1980); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 557 F. Supp. 1058, 1065 (D. Del. 1983)) ("the
District Court for Delaware has stated that even membership and knowledge of the associa-
tion's wrongful conduct is not, by itself, sufficient to show 'knowing participation,' but once
that is coupled with a consistent later act, an inference of knowing participation is permissi-
ble."). James Julian, Inc., 557 F. Supp. at 1065 n. 18.
33. Nicolet, 525 A.2d at 148 (quoting In re Asbestos Litig., 509 A.2d at 1121).
34. Id.
35. There were several items of evidence supporting the plaintiffs' claims of conspiracy
and giving rise to triable issues of fact. First, the president of Nicolet, as well as other mem-
bers of ATI, received a letter from the U.S. Navy asking questions with regard to asbestos, its
hazards and whether adequate substitutions for asbestos existed. Second, a letter dated May
28, 1969, sent to Johns-Manville from Raybestos-Manhattan, with copies to ATI's Board of
Governors, stated in part that members of the trade association should discourage a develop-
ment program on substitutes for asbestos. Third, on May 26, 1969, the president of Nicolet
responded to the U.S. Navy's inquiry by stating that a considerable amount of scientific re-
search is being conducted on the biological effects of asbestos; that current research results
leave substantial doubt concerning the issue of whether and to what extent asbestos is harmful
to health; and if asbestos is harmful, we [Nicolet] do not know why. In re Asbestos Litig., 509
A.2d at 1121-22.
36. Nicolet, 525 A.2d at 147.
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in furtherance of the scheme.",37
The Nicolet court outlined the theories upon which tort actions for con-
spiracy and fraudulent concealment may be based.3' First, the court relied
on Stephenson v. Capano Development, Inc. ,39 a case outlining the elements
necessary to establish a prima facie case of intentional misrepresentation
(fraudulent concealment). Briefly, these elements include: deliberate con-
cealment by defendant of a material past or present fact; silence in the face of
a duty to speak; scienter; intent to induce plaintiff's reliance on concealment;
causation; and damages resulting from concealment.'
The Nicolet court examined the plaintiffs' allegations utilizing the Stephen-
son elements of fraud, and summarized their findings as follows: plaintiffs'
complaint includes allegations that Nicolet possessed medical and scientific
data on the hazards of asbestos; Nicolet positively and falsely asserted to
plaintiffs that it was safe for them to work in close proximity to asbestos
materials, thus causing the plaintiffs to remain ignorant of the dangers;
Nicolet knowingly and willfully conspired with other asbestos manufactur-
ers to withhold this information, thus Nicolet acted with scienter; and there
was intent by the alleged conspirators, including Nicolet, to induce plaintiffs'
reliance on false or incomplete material facts.4" Given these allegations, the
Nicolet court concluded the evidence was sufficient to state a tort claim
based on a theory of fraudulent concealment.42
Having decided the fraudulent concealment issue, the court focused next
on the conspiracy claim. The Nicolet court again relied upon case law, this
time in denying Nicolet's motion for summary judgment on the conspiracy
issue.43 Delaware law imposing liability for civil conspiracy is well settled, 4
37. Id.
38. Id. at 149-150.
39. 462 A.2d 1069 (Del. 1983). The court in Nicolet affirmed that the plaintiffs' allega-
tions were sufficient to state a tort claim based on a theory of fraudulent concealment. Nicolet,
525 A.2d at 149.
40. Stephenson, 462 A.2d at 1074.
41. Nicolet, 525 A.2d at 149.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 150. Further, civil conspiracy does not exist as an independent cause of action
in Delaware. It exists to implicate others and to increase the measure of damages. See Phoe-
nix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1372, 1388 n.43 (D. Del. 1983); rev'd in part,
on other grounds, 658 F. Supp. 1061 (D. Del. 1987). In addition, while the essence of the crime
of conspiracy is the agreement, the essence of a civil conspiracy is damages. In other words,
absent damages, there is no cause of action for a civil conspiracy. See Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). See
also McLaughlin v. Copeland, 455 F. Supp. 749, 752 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd without op., 595
F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1979).
44. McLaughlin, 455 F.Supp. at 752 (quoting Van Royen v. Lacey, 262 Md. 94, 97, 277
A.2d 13, 14 (1971)). (In Van Royen the court stated that plaintiffs must prove: "in addition to
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and the court concluded that Nicolet would be subject to liability if the
plaintiffs established the following:
(1) Nicolet was a member of a conspiracy consisting of asbestos
manufacturers; (2) a member of the conspiracy, acting in further-
ance of the conspiracy, actively suppressed data on the harmful
effects of asbestos with the intent to hide such information from
plaintiffs in order to induce them to continue their exposure (i.e.,
committed the tort of intentional misrepresentation); and, (3)
plaintiffs were injured as a result of the unlawful acts of Nicolet's
co-conspirator(s).45
Nicolet contended that no independent tort existed to support conspiracy
liability.4 6 However, the court correctly concluded that the independent tort
supporting the conspiracy charge is intentional misrepresentation.47 Nicolet
also argued that it had no duty to warn the customers of other asbestos
manufacturers regarding the health hazards associated with asbestos.48 The
Nicolet court distinguished between those situations where a party fails to
speak (where there is no duty to speak absent a contractual or fiduciary rela-
tionship), and those situations where a party actively suppresses and con-
ceals material information (where liability attaches as a result of the active
misconduct of intentionally suppressing material information).49 In this
case, plaintiffs alleged the latter. The court concluded: "should plaintiffs'
establish that Nicolet was a member of a conspiracy which actively sup-
pressed and concealed material facts, with the intent to induce plaintiffs'
continued exposure to asbestos, Nicolet would be jointly and severally liable
with its co-conspirators for resulting damages." °
a confederation of two or more persons; (1) some unlawful act done in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and (2) actual legal damage resulting to the victim-plaintiff."). Id.
45. Nicolet, 525 A.2d at 150.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Defendant, Nicolet, Inc., cited Bumette v. Nicolet, Inc., No. 84-2063, slip op. at 6
(4th Cir. July 25, 1986) arguing that a cause of action does not exist for fraudulent conceal-
ment absent a contractual or fiduciary duty. Nicolet, 525 A.2d at 150 n.3. The Court in
Nicolet declined to adopt the Fourth Circuit's interpretation and limitations, and instead be-
lieved that a better and more reasoned approach is to recognize a cause of action for fraudulent
concealment wherever the plaintiff can establish active, rather than passive, concealment. The
Nicolet court followed Michigan's approach in Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1581
(E.D.. Mich. 1987) (where the court stated that justice demands a remedy whenever manufac-
turers cooperate to conceal product risk, with resulting injury from that concealment). Id.
The Court in Nicolet, however, did not consider the issue of whether the plaintiffs proffered
enough evidence to pursue the conspiracy claim, stating that it was beyond the scope of this
appeal. Id. at 150 n.4. In sum, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision denying
Nicolet's motion for summary judgment on the conspiracy issue. Id. at 150.
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IV. THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt UPON THE
ASBESTOS MANUFACTURERS AND ASBESTOS EMPLOYERS
It is likely that the decision to allow conspiracy claims against asbestos
manufacturers will have a very dramatic effect upon the quantity of suits
brought against such defendants before the Delaware courts. Assuming that
both asbestos manufacturers and asbestos employers know of the possible
health risks of asbestos, asbestos employers are relieved of the timeliness and
expense of litigation because such conspiracy suits against employers are
barred by Delaware's workmen's compensation laws. The following section
represents a scenario that may result in current and future asbestos litigation
in the Delaware courts.
A. Employers - Compensation: Manufacturers - Damages
For purposes of this section, it is assumed that a plaintiff can proffer
enough evidence to sustain a conspiracy and fraudulent concealment charge
against his former employer, an asbestos company, and against the manufac-
turer who supplied the asbestos to his employer. The plaintiff, suffering
from disease purportedly caused by exposure to asbestos, has basically two
avenues for relief. In a suit against his employer, the plaintiff can collect
workmen's compensation as provided through Delaware's workmen's com-
pensation law.51 The workmen's compensation law's exclusivity provision,52
however, bars recovery against an employer under any common law the-
ory,5 3 even in cases where the employer actively concealed and suppressed
information on workplace hazards.54 Thus, the employee-plaintiff who con-
tracts an occupational disease, such as asbestosis, may recover from the em-
ployer-defendant only those benefits provided by statute.
The plaintiff can also elect to sue the asbestos manufacturer for conspiracy
to conceal information relating to the dangers of asbestos. Here, the plaintiff
is entitled to collect a much larger award in the form of compensatory and
51. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2301 - 2304 (1974).
52. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1974).
53. Powell v. Interstate Vendaway, Inc., 300 A.2d 241 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972). See also
Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del. 1982) ("all employee actions against
employers for work-related injuries based on any degree of negligence, from slight to gross, are
within the exclusive coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Law and may not be main-
tained under the common law.").
54. See generally Kofron, 441 A.2d 226 (worker's compensation statute is exclusive rem-
edy and precludes intentional tort actions by asbestos workers who allege fraudulent conceal-
ment of known health dangers related to asbestos.); Farrall v. Armstrong Cork Co., 457 A.2d
763, 770 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) ("to the extent that the conspiracy charge is directed against
employer-defendants, . ... it is barred by the exclusivity principle already considered.").
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punitive damages. 55 Punitive damages are awarded to punish a tortfeasor
for willful or reckless conduct which is particularly reprehensible.5 6 Dela-
ware has allowed punitive damage awards for almost 150 years and the court
has stated that it is not in a position to reject this historical foundation in
favor of the defendant's (manufacturer's) contrary policy and philosophical
considerations. 57
Thus, because of the exclusivity provision in Delaware's workmen's com-
pensation laws, employers have escaped not only the expense and timeliness
of civil litigation with respect to conspiracy charges, but also the expenses
associated with awards of complete compensatory and punitive damages to
the employee. No mathematical formula is needed to show that a large dis-
crepancy exists between the statutory amount recoverable under workers'
compensation and the full tort damages which may be recovered through
litigation. The Nicolet decision, in allowing plaintiffs to sue asbestos manu-
facturers for conspiring to fraudulently conceal pertinent medical and scien-
tific information, has in essence, shifted the costs of such conspiracies solely
to the asbestos manufacturers. This result is inherently unfair to both asbes-
tos manufacturers and employee-plaintiffs.
B. The Sophisticated Purchaser Defense
The sophisticated purchaser defense has gained widespread popularity
among manufacturers, suppliers and distributors of products as a means for
escaping liability. 58  Delaware recently decided that such a defense was
55. The amount recoverable through a workmen's compensation claim is relatively small
when compared to compensatory and punitive damage awards received through litigation. See
OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT, supra note 2, at 17, 22, & 115.
56. Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 718 (Del. 1970) ("[p]unitive or exemplary damages
are allowed not by way of recompense for injury, but as punishment to the tortfeasor when his
wrongful acts are committed wantonly and willfully."). See also Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d
711, 714 (Del. 1972) ("[p]unitive damages should bear a relationship to the type of conduct,
keeping always in mind that the compensatory damages have already made the victim
'whole'."). Since 1981, plaintiffs have been successful in asserting that manufacturers should
be subject to punitive damages because these companies deliberately concealed information
about the perils of asbestos. See Special Project, supra note 4, at 690-709.
57. Nutt v. GAF Corp., No. 80C-FE-8, slip op. 2-3 (Del. Super. Ct. March 16, 1987)
(LEXIS, State Library, Del. file). See also Conway v. A.C. & S. Co., No. 82C-AP-77, (Del.
Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1987) (LEXIS, State Library, Del. file) (defendant argued that an award of
punitive damages would be contrary to public policy, i.e., that punitive damages were devel-
oped originally to satisfy societal goals of deterrence and punishment, and that today, compen-
satory damages have increased tremendously, and criminal and regulatory statutes have
assumed greater roles in deterrence and punishment).
58. See In re Asbestos Litig. (Merganthaler), 542 A.2d 1205, 1209-12 (Del. Super. Ct.
1986). Delaware, in deciding whether or not to adopt the sophisticated purchaser defense in
this case, provides an in depth discussion of those states that have adopted the sophisticated
purchaser defense in one form or another.
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available:
[W]hen a supplier provides a product it knows to be dangerous to a
purchaser/employer whom the supplier knows or reasonably be-
lieves is aware of that danger, there is no duty on the part of the
supplier to warn the employees of that purchaser unless the sup-
plier knows or has reason to suspect that the requisite warning will
fail to reach the employees, the users of the product.59
Consequently, in assessing the availability of the defense, the first question to
be asked is whether a manufacturer or supplier must warn the purchaser/
employer of the dangers of a product. If the employer already knows or
should be aware of the dangers which the warning would cover, there would
be no duty to warn on the part of the supplier." The second question is
whether the supplier or manufacturer knew or had reason to suspect that the
requisite warnings would fail to reach the employees.61 If the supplier or
manufacturer knew or had reason to know that employees would not be
adequately warned, the manufacturers/suppliers then incur a duty to rea-
sonably warn of the dangerous use of its product.62 Without this defense,
courts may hold manufacturers liable for uses of their product that may have
been unforeseeable. Moreover, lack of this defense makes it the responsibil-
ity of every primary manufacturing company, no matter how far down the
chain of distribution, to ensure that the ultimate user is warned. This ap-
pears to be contrary to industrial reality since the manufacturer may never
know who in fact is the ultimate user of its asbestos products.
Manufacturers who are successful in asserting such a defense escape liabil-
ity from a charge of negligent failure to warn. Since the employer is pro-
tected from such a suit, the employee's only recourse is workmen's
compensation. Where the sophisticated purchaser defense is successful, the
costs of failure to warn thus appear to shift to the employee. The employer,
in reality, has the last clear chance to warn its employees of dangers related
to the product, and because of Delaware's exclusivity provision, the em-
ployer escapes such liability. If the exclusivity provision were repealed,
plaintiffs would have a better chance to recover compensation for their occu-
59. Id. at 1212. The court also stated: "[t]he 'sophisticated purchaser' defense focuses on
the issue of reasonable care that is: is it reasonable for a supplier to rely on a knowledgeable
purchaser/employer to warn its employees of a known danger." Id. at 1209.
60. Id. at 1212.
61. Id. at 1213.
62. In considering the reasonableness of the warning, one may consider the color, size,
location and prominence of the warning together with the clarity of its language. See Temple
v. Raymark Indus., No. 82C-JL-80, slip op. at 26 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 1988) (1988 Del.
Super. LEXIS 339).
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pational injuries because it would be far easier for employees to establish an
employer's failure to warn.
C Amendment of Delaware's Workmen's Compensation Law
There is no reason, legal or otherwise, for giving employers an escape
hatch from conspiracy claims in asbestos litigation. As the Delaware court
noted, "an occupational disease [such as asbestosis] arising out of or during
the course of employment is compensable under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, and under that law the employer is bound to pay, and the em-
ployee is bound to accept, compensation as determined under the applicable
provisions of the Law." 63
Employers are not burdened with conspiracy suits because of the work-
men's compensation law's exclusivity provision.64 If the employee-plaintiff
can proffer enough evidence for a cause of action against his employer, and
prove he was in fact involved in a conspiracy to suppress pertinent medical
and scientific data on the toxicity of asbestos, then the employer should be
compelled to defend against this claim. Plaintiffs should be allowed to elect
their remedies in situations where the facts warrant it, that is, "to forego
compensation ... under the statutes in favor of suing the employer at law for
damages ... because of what they feel to have been grossly negligent or
intentionally tortious conduct on the part of the employer in causing the
condition which gave rise to the occupational disease. ' '65 This can only be
accomplished if Delaware's legislature amends the workmen's compensation
law to allow a plaintiff the right to elect his remedy. If Delaware would
amend their Workers' Compensation statutes to allow plaintiffs the right to
elect their remedies, suits such as Nicolet would not be limited to the manu-
facturers. Moreover, employers who conspire to conceal information per-
taining to asbestos disease could be held accountable for their outrageous
misconduct.
63. Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 232 (Del. 1982) (Brown, J.,
concurring).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1974).
65. Kofron, 441 A.2d at 233 (Brown, J., concurring). The Kofron court stated: "[w]hile
legislatures in other states have specifically allowed employees to proceed with a common law
cause of action based on the theory that their employers maintained a dangerous working
environment with the intent to injure them.., our Legislature [Delaware] has not done so and
we [the court] decline to act in its stead." Id. at 231. Further, the court "believe[d] that any
changes in the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Law must come from the Legislature,
whence it came which, because of increasing informational input from both employer and
employee lobbies, is perhaps best equipped to grapple with this issue." Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
In view of the legislative history of the exclusivity provision of the work-
men's compensation law, both in its original and amended forms, and con-
sidering the prior case law interpreting the scope of the statute, it is apparent
that an employee who has an occupational disease cannot sue his employer
for the conspiracy of fraudulent concealment or failure to warn of the
hazards of asbestos. Because the Nicolet decision allows a similar cause of
action against manufacturers of asbestos, such manufacturers will be sued at
an increasing rate.
If both asbestos employers and manufacturers conspire among themselves
and with each other not to disclose information related to the dangers of
asbestos exposure, then they are both guilty of outrageous misconduct.
Manufacturers of asbestos should not be the only parties hauled into court
for such gross misbehavior. A more fair and reasonable approach to this
inequity is to allow plaintiffs the right to sue their employers outright for
such willful and wanton conduct. This approach also allows more plaintiffs
the opportunity to collect damages, since it is far easier for the employee to
establish that the employer, rather than the manufacturer or supplier, is
guilty of negligent failure to warn. In effect, this will justifiably spread the
expense of such claims among those who caused the damage. This can only
be accomplished by the legislature's repealing the exclusivity principle, or
carving an exception to the rule in conspiracy cases, to allow such suits
against asbestos employers. Given the inequity such a statute produces, it is
well to remember a telling phrase spoken by Ulysses S. Grant, "I know no
method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their
stringent execution." 66
Marina C. Appleton
66. Inaugural Address of Ulysses S. Grant (March 4, 1869), reprinted in THE INAUGU-
RAL ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1985 78-79 (1985).

